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Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory 
 Political behaviour always involves social groups, whether these take the form of 
concrete networks and gatherings of individuals such as pressure groups, demonstrations, 
governments, cadres or committees, or whether they are constituted as large-scale institutions 
or imagined communities (Anderson, 1991) such as polities, states, political parties, interest 
groups, publics, constituencies or electorates. In so far as social groups are central to politics, 
it follows that the psychology of groups should be relevant to our understanding of political 
psychology. Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory represent major 
theoretical attempts to clarify the social psychological processes associated with group 
membership and action, and should therefore be in a good position to provide a significant 
contribution to that understanding. 
 Social Identity Theory (SIT) developed from Tajfel’s work on intergroup processes 
which focused on the genesis of conflict between social groups, and the factors which 
influence support for, or attempts to change, established social hierarchies (e.g., Tajfel, 1974, 
1978a; 1978b; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Turner (1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & 
Wetherell, 1987) later adopted some aspects of this approach as the basis for his Self-
Categorization Theory (SCT) of group behaviour in general. Because the two theories share 
many key assumptions, they are often discussed under the general label of ‘the Social Identity 
approach’ or ‘the Social Identity tradition’. 
 Early research adopting the Social Identity approach to intergroup relations often 
investigated real world political behaviour, including political party affiliation (Kelly, 1988), 
trades union participation (Kelly & Kelly, 1994); the Northern Ireland conflict (Cairns & 
Mercer, 1984), Hindu-Muslim relations in India (Ghosh & Kumar, 1991), and responses to 
the Sino-British accord in Hong Kong (Bond & Hewstone, 1988). Tajfel’s model, which 
emphasised how intergroup conflict could be rooted in concerns over collective identity as 
well as competition over material resources, was especially relevant to the New Social 
Movements that arose during the 1960s and 70s (Reicher, Spears & Haslam, 2010; Tajfel, 
1978b), and social psychologists subsequently applied SIT to the women’s movement 
(Williams & Giles, 1978) as well as ethnolinguistic minority group movements (Giles, 1977). 
Later, as SIT came to be increasingly adopted as a general metatheoretical perspective by 
social psychologists (Abrams & Hogg, 2004), fewer researchers focused on its particular 
relevance to political attitudes and action (although see Brewer, 2001; Huddy, 2001; Oakes, 
2002; Reicher, 2004). However, the past decade has witnessed a renaissance of interest in the 
ways in which SIT and SCT might enhance social psychological understanding of a range of 
formal and informal political behaviour, including party identification (Greene, 2004), 
political solidarity and affiliation (Subašić, Reynolds & Turner, 2008), leadership (Haslam, 
Reicher & Platow, 2010; Hogg, 2001), political rhetoric (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b, 
2001), political participation and activism (Drury, 2012; Muldoon & Lowe, 2012; Thomas, 
McGarty & Mavor, 2009), schism (Sani & Pugliese, 2008), national separatism (Sindic & 
Reicher, 2009), conspiracy theorising (Sapountzis & Condor, 2013) and extremism (Baray, 
Postmes & Jetten, 2009; Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009; Hogg, 2012).  
 It is now beyond the scope of a single chapter to provide a comprehensive overview of 
the ways in which the social identity approach might contribute to political psychology (see 
Ispas, 2013). Consequently, for the purposes of this chapter we will focus on two general 
issues. First, we will clarify, and where necessary distinguish, the key theoretical assumptions 
of SIT and SCT as they relate to political cognition and action. Second, because politics 
involves both groups and power, we will focus on some of the issues where the dynamics of 
identity and power intersect. This will include a consideration of the political consequences of 
identity management strategies, and a discussion of the particular case of politicized 
identities. 
 Social Identity Theory: Identity strategies and the dynamics of intergroup relations 
 
 Tajfel originally defined social identity as “that part of an individual's self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978a, p. 63). 
According to this perspective, group membership provides people with a sense of their 
distinct place in the social world (where they stand in relations to others) and acts as a 
practical guide to action by imparting the norms concerning the typical, appropriate or 
desirable forms of behaviour associated with a particular group membership. More 
specifically, Tajfel claimed that the processes associated with social (as opposed to personal) 
identity underpin intergroup (as opposed to interpersonal) behaviour. That is, to the extent 
that people see themselves and others in terms of group membership, and to the extent that 
they personally identify with the social group to which they belong, they will tend to act 
towards others as group members rather than as unique individuals. In emphasising the 
distinctive character of collective behaviour, Tajfel’s approach differed from existing social 
psychological perspectives that often sought to explain intergroup behaviour with reference to 
the personality traits of particular individuals (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950). Indeed, one 
fundamental assumption that underpins SIT is that groups and not individuals are the main 
engine of both social conflict and social change (Reicher, Spears, Haslam & Reynolds, 2012). 
SIT proposes a motivational element to intergroup behaviour (see, e.g., Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) by suggesting that people are generally concerned to maintain, or to achieve, a 
positive sense of self, and that when they identify with social groups, this manifests itself in a 
need to perceive the groups to which they belong positively (for a review, see, e.g., Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998). Moreover, SIT also proposes that social categories are necessarily defined 
and evaluated comparatively. Consequently, in order to achieve a positive evaluation of their 
group, group members will be motivated to establish, and to maintain, a positive 
differentiation (i.e., positive distinctiveness) between ingroup and relevant outgroups on 
valued dimensions of comparison (Tajfel, 1978a). Membership of groups consensually 
regarded as superior will confer a positive social identity, and conversely membership of 
groups consensually regarded as inferior will confer a negative or unsatisfactory social 
identity, which may, under certain conditions, motivate the members of those groups to take 
collective action towards challenging the existing social hierarchy and the inferior status 
conferred to their group.  
 Of particular relevance to political psychology is the fact that SIT provides a model of 
the ideological context in which the identity management strategies that people adopt to deal 
with an unsatisfactory social identity may be expected to lead to collective action (for more 
extended overview of identity management strategies, see, e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke 
& Klink, 1998; Brown, 2000; Ellemers, 1993; Haslam, 2001). The most important of these 
conditions is arguably the perceived permeability of group boundaries, that is, the extent to 
which people believe that it is possible for individuals to move between social groups. In so 
far as members of socially devalued groups perceive individual mobility to be possible, they 
may respond to their inferior status by attempting to “move up” the social hierarchy and by 
psychologically dis-identifying with the group to which they currently belong. However, 
when such mobility is perceived to be impossible or undesirable, people may engage in 
various forms of collective activity aimed at changing the comparative value associated with 
their group as a whole.  
 Tajfel described the latter situation as involving an ideology of social change. The 
term ‘social change’, however, is potentially misleading, since under these ideological 
conditions members of devalued groups will not necessarily attempt to challenge the existing 
intergroup hierarchy directly. According to SIT, the kind of collective activity that members 
of devalued social groups engage in will depend upon the perceived security of intergroup 
comparisons (Tajfel; 1978a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Perceived security can be subdivided 
into two aspects. The first concerns the perceived legitimacy of the status quo – for example, 
whether people assume that their inferior status has been justly ordained or deserved. The 
second concerns the availability of cognitive alternatives: the possibility of imagining 
changes to the existing intergroup status quo. Where existing intergroup hierarchies are 
perceived as legitimate, and/or where cognitive alternatives are not available, low status group 
members are unlikely to challenge the outgroup directly. Instead, they may attempt to attain a 
positive social identity by strategically comparing their group with another of lower status, re-
evaluating the labels and symbols conventionally associated with their group, or adopting 
strategies of social creativity to forge a favourable identity for their ingroup on new 
dimensions of comparison. It is only when unfavourable intergroup comparisons are 
perceived as illegitimate and where cognitive alternative are present that members of 
devalued social groups will engage in social competition and attempt to directly contest their 
inferior status. 
 Members of high status groups also have at their disposal a variety of strategies that 
mirror those of the low status groups, which may be used in an effort to maintain their 
position in the intergroup hierarchy. For example, they may attempt to make intergroup 
boundaries appear permeable by allowing a few outgroup members to pass, but in proportion 
that remain largely symbolic (tokenism; see Wright & Taylor, 1998). Similarly, in an attempt 
to maintain existing social hierarchies, members of dominant social groups may seek to 
legitimate the status quo, for example, through reference to innate differences between human 
gender, nations or races.  
 
Social Identity Theory and the psychology of politics 
 
 How can the model of social identity strategies proposed by SIT contribute to our 
understanding of political psychology? In general terms, the need and ability of humans to 
actively distinguish themselves from each other, which lies at the core of the theory, can be 
seen as both the condition of possibility and the very raison d’être of politics, if we define 
politics as that paradoxical human activity that both promotes differentiation between human 
beings and aims to deal with its problematic consequences (e.g., Arendt, 1958). However, a 
more restricted definition of politics is that it concerns the dynamics of power, and more 
specifically the processes of obtaining and using that power in public life. From that point of 
view, SIT’s focus on the social-psychological evaluation of identities may appear to 
downplay the political aspects intergroup relations, since the ultimate goal of identity 
management strategies has conventionally been understood as being about status rather than 
power. In so far as they have addresses issues of power, Social Identity theorists have tended 
to focus on the ways in which power may impact upon the quest for positive social identity, 
rather than focussing upon political power as a key problem in its own right (e.g., Sachdev & 
Bourhis, 1991). Moreover, there is a large proportion of SIT research that tend to treat power 
and status as synonymous, using terms like ‘dominant/subordinate groups’, ‘high/low status 
groups’ or ‘majority/minority’ interchangeably (for classic discussions of the distinction 
between the constructs of status and power, see Goldhamer & Shils, 1939; Weber, 1958). 
  Nevertheless, the potential relevance of SIT to political psychology becomes apparent 
once we appreciate how status and power are often related in practice. Changes in group 
status can act as catalyst for, or constitute an outcome of, political change, and conversely 
status inertia often go hand in hand with maintaining the political status quo. In practice, the 
success of the various identity management strategies adopted by members of low status 
groups is likely to depend on the groups’ access to power. Similarly, the extent to which a 
high status group may be able to (for example) convince others of their innate superiority is 
likely to depend on their effective control of media of education and communication as well 
as their privileged status per se. Conversely, the identity management strategies adopted by 
members of low status groups may not simply enhance the subjective value of their identity, 
but may also affect power relationships. In fact, there are always political consequences 
associated with the different strategies for achieving a satisfactory social identity, whether or 
not these are imagined or intended by the social actors concerned. For example, when 
individuals pursue a strategy of individual mobility, their choice makes it harder for other 
members of their group to organize any form of political or social resistance. In contrast, 
strategies of symbolic social competition (e.g., challenging existing group stereotypes) may 
help to mobilise group members to political action (Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997). 
Overall, the identity dynamics described by SIT can therefore be said to be political in the 
sense that they both shape and are shaped by power dynamics. 
 However, there are also limits to the contribution of the theory to our understanding of 
political dynamics. First, as Rubin and Hewstone note (2004), although SIT does not preclude 
considerations of power, and indeed invites a more detailed analysis of power dynamics and 
their interaction with identity processes, such analysis generally remains to be developed (but 
for recent developments in that direction, see Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010; Simon & 
Oakes, 2006; Sindic, Barreto & Costa-Lopes, in press; Turner, 2005). 
 Second, although most work adopting SIT has focused on struggles over status rather 
than conflicts over political power, there have been (as we noted earlier) notable exceptions as 
well as a recent revival of interest in applying SIT to political behaviour. However, any 
thoroughgoing attempt to apply SIT in this area requires a consideration of group behaviour 
which is directed at political goals in their own right. For that reason it challenges what has 
for some become a key assumption of the theory, namely that all group action can necessarily 
and ultimately be understood as a quest for status. In that respect, it should be noted that the 
message in Tajfel’s original writing was not that intergroup conflict could be reduced to social 
competition over status, but rather that this struggle should be understood as an intervening 
mechanism in conflicts over other type of goods (e.g., those who accept their negative identity 
are unlikely to challenge their political disadvantage since they see such inequalities as 
legitimate on the basis of their lower status). That is, Tajfel’s primary concern was for the 
ways in which group identification provides the psychological basis for collective social 
action designed to challenge concrete economic and political as well as social inequalities. In 
that context, the struggle over status can represent but the means towards other ends, 
including political ones. This political preoccupation of Tajfel is apparent if we consider, for 
instance, his views that stereotypes “cannot be understood without a consideration of the 
functions they serve in the competitive and power relationships between the groups 
concerned” (Tajfel & Forgas, 1982, p.133). It is true that the function of social differentiation 
(the role of stereotypes “in helping to preserve or create positively valued differentiations 
between one’s own and other social groups”) centres on questions of group status. However, 
the functions of social explanation and social justification (the role of stereotypes “in 
contributing to the creation and maintenance of group “ideologies” explaining or justifying a 
variety of social actions”) are clearly oriented towards political goals (p. 134). 
 Finally, one can question the extent to which SIT is able to deal with the specific 
phenomena of politicized identities, that is with collective identities that are normatively 
defined in terms of an explicit political commitment and where group members are 
consciously aware of being part of a power struggle (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). At 
present SIT remains somewhat unclear on the extent to which the eventual political 
consequences of identity management strategies can be traced back to the deliberate intent of 
the social actors concerned. For example, a White comedian making a joke about Black 
people may very well contribute to perpetuate negative stereotypes about Black people and 
thereby help to maintain their lower status and subordinate position in society. However, the 
immediate goal of the comedian might really be only to make other people laugh (Condor, 
1990). That is, there may not be any explicit political intent behind the joke, nor any 
awareness by the comedian of ‘White people’ as a politicized identity, involved in a power 
struggle with ‘Black people’ – contrary to, say, the case of a White supremacist making the 
exact same joke (Billig, 2005). At present, SIT does not really allow us to differentiate clearly 
between those two cases, despite the fact that they do differ in important respects.  
 Thus, despite their pervasive political consequences, it is not clear whether the social 
identity dynamics described by SIT can be called political in the full sense of the term. This, 
of course, does not mean that such identity processes are irrelevant to our understanding of 
politicized identities, but rather that the generic focus of the theory may need to be 
complemented by other approaches tailored to tackle this more specific issue. There are in 
fact other specific characteristics of politicized identities that the theory has difficulties with, 
which will be addressed after we review Self Categorization Theory. 
 
Self-categorization Theory 
 
 As noted above, SIT proposes that people act in terms of their social identity 
whenever they see themselves and others in term of group membership rather than as 
particular individuals. Another way to put this is that social identity processes come into play 
when people categorize themselves (and others) as group members. Self-Categorization 
Theory focuses on the nature, antecedents and consequences of this psychological process of 
self-categorization.  
 In terms of the nature of the process, SCT postulates that when we self-categorize as 
group members we come to see ourselves as similar to (and interchangeable with) other 
ingroup members on the key stereotypical aspects that define the group, a process termed 
depersonalization. This does not involve a loss of selfhood (as is the case in deindividuation, 
see Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995), but involves the experience of the self as defined by 
group membership rather than by unique individual characteristics. This is very close to SIT’s 
notion of social identification, but one key difference is that in SCT social categories are 
always part of a hierarchical structure as a function of their level of inclusiveness. For 
example, Simon may see himself as a unique individual when amongst friends, as a political 
psychologist when comparing himself to cognitive psychologists, as a social scientist when 
comparing himself to natural scientists, and all the way up to defining himself as a human in 
comparison to other species. Thus, the choice is not between different unrelated identities but 
between different identities nested into each other. 
 One implication of this hierarchical structure is that a particular category or identity is 
not solely defined by its comparison with another group situated on the same level of 
categorization. Its definition also depends upon its relation with the level of categorization 
immediately above it. In particular, the superordinate category that encompasses both ingroup 
and outgroup(s) provides the specific dimensions of comparisons along which the groups are 
contrasted. This is because the superordinate category defines the prototype of what the 
groups should be like. For example, members of national groups will not compare themselves 
along any random dimension, but along the prototypical characteristics of a great or a good 
nation. This factor may help to explain why groups often choose to compete on the same 
dimension of comparison. It also alerts us to the ways in which political arguments often 
relate not only to the outcome of intergroup comparisons (e.g., whether “our” political party is 
better or worse than another), but to the prototype of the superordinate category (what 
political parties, in general, should be like). Consequently, group members may be inclined to 
define superordinate categories in such a way as to favour their own group over relevant 
outgroups in the ensuing intergroup comparisons (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). 
 In terms of the antecedents of the self-categorization process, the main question 
addressed by SCT relates to the question of why any particular categorization should be 
psychologically salient in a particular context. Following ideas first outlined by Bruner 
(1957), SCT proposes that the psychological salience of a particular level of self-
categorisation is determined through an interaction of accessibility and fit (Oakes, 1987; 
Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). Accessibility, or perceiver readiness, refers to an 
individual's readiness to use a given set of categories as a function of past experience, present 
expectations, motives, values, goals and needs (which includes all the factors contributing to 
long-term social identification). The concept of fit concerns the relationship between the 
nature of categories and external reality, and can be divided into two aspects. Comparative fit 
refers to the relationship between categories and the distribution of intragroup vs. intergroup 
differences: the set of categories that maximize the ratio of intergroup differences compared 
to intra-group differences will be most salient. Normative fit refers to the fact that the specific 
content of these differences should match the stereotypical expectations associated with these 
categories. For instance, if a group discussion is split on a question of welfare spending, with 
some people arguing for more support for unemployed people and others for less, political 
orientation is likely to become salient and participants are likely to categorize themselves as 
liberals vs. conservatives, because the categories account for the differences in orientation 
adopted by individuals, and because such differences are in line with existing stereotypes 
concerning political ideology.  
 In terms of the consequences of self-categorization processes, the principles outlined 
by SCT have been applied to many different areas (e.g., see Turner et al., 1987; Haslam, 
2001), but there is one area in particular that has perhaps received the most attention and that 
is also directly relevant to our understanding of politics, namely the processes of social 
influence (Turner, 1991). Social influence is key to many political processes, including the 
spread of political ideas, elections and voting, political mobilization, and the very nature of 
political power (Lukes, 2005). For SCT, social influence does not depend solely on the 
characteristics of the message, the messenger and/or the audience (see Hovland, Janis & 
Kelly, 1953). It also depends on the relationship between messenger and audience that is 
established by the self-categories employed in a particular social context.  
 Specifically, the consequences of the process of self-categorisation on influence are 
threefold. First, the nature of the salient self-categories will determine who we can influence 
and who we should be influenced by. That is, the process of self-categorization creates the 
expectation that we will agree with other ingroup members and disagree with outgroup 
members (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990), so that social influence 
should only take place in the former case since only people sharing a common group 
membership will try and reach a consensus. Second, the specific content (i.e. stereotypes, 
norms and values) associated with the salient self-category will determine who, amongst 
ingroup members, will be seen as prototypical (i.e. embodying the groups’ spirit and values) 
and is therefore more likely to be influential. Finally, the specific content of ingroup identity 
also sets limits on the nature of the messages that can be influential: influence will be limited 
to messages which are seen to be consistent with the group stereotypes, values and norms. 
 These processes are also important for the related phenomenon of leadership. SCT 
focuses not merely on the personal qualities that make a good leader, but also on the 
relationships between leaders and followers (e.g., Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010). 
According to SCT, effective leaders need to present themselves as embodying the group’s 
identity and will, but followers are not passive in that process since they help define the 
dimensions along which the prototypicality of a potential leader will be assessed. Thus 
followers ‘make’ the leader as much as the leader ‘attracts’ followers.  
 
The social identity tradition and the psychology of politics revisited 
  
By way of conclusion, we return to the issue of how the Social Identity approach (this 
time with the inclusion of SCT) might help our understanding of politicized identities. We 
have already suggested that politicized identities possess specific features that make them 
more than just one type of identity amongst many. One important factor is that the power 
dynamics in which politicized identities are involved can only make sense in the context of a 
common superordinate group. A political protest for equal rights between Blacks and Whites, 
for instance, can only make sense if we invoke a superior category that provides the 
framework within which judgments about the existing (in)equalities between groups and their 
legitimacy are made (e.g., Black people deserve the same rights as White people because they 
are all human beings). SIT’s focus on the nuclear situation of two group in a dyadic 
relationship, apparently isolated from their relationships to other groups and the rest of 
society, might lead to disregard this aspect. However, SCT’s tenet that the relationships 
between groups is always mediated by their common membership into a shared superordinate 
category (which provides the dimensions of intergroup comparisons) highlights this important 
aspect of political cognition and rhetoric.  
 The relationship of groups to a superordinate category can also help to account for two 
supplementary and related facts about political behaviour. First, a great deal of political action 
is not (or not only) simply directed at the outgroup per se but at a more general audience 
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Those who argue for the extension of rights for ethnic 
minority groups, for instance, have probably little hope to be heard by those against whom 
they protest. Rather, their call for justice may be directed towards fellow ingroup members 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), but also towards the larger public who may possibly be won to 
their cause (Condor, Tileaga & Billig, 2013). This is illustrated by protesters all over the 
globe using protest signs written in English, even when the protest is taking place in a non-
English speaking country. The attempt to mobilize a “universal audience” (see Condor et al., 
2013) only makes sense if protesters assume that, because of their common superordinate 
membership, people from other groups may share the same dimensions of judgment and thus 
should be able to assess the legitimacy of their claim. 
 Second, political groups do not always act in terms of the interest of their own group 
defined in narrow terms. Political parties, for instance, do not claim to act solely for the 
benefit of their own party, but for the benefit of the country as a whole. Conflict between 
parties, then, is shaped not only by the relation of one group to another but by their common 
relationship to a superordinate category. The latter not only defines the ‘rules of engagement’, 
but the possibility to steer its direction and fulfil its interests may be what is ultimately at 
stake. This is why claims about the prototypicality of the ingroup in relations to the 
superordinate category (e.g., that ‘we’ better represent what our compatriots are like and what 
they want) can be made for political reasons (Sindic & Reicher, 2008). 
 Nevertheless, there are at least two other issues related to politicized identities with 
which the Social Identity tradition currently struggles. First, although both SIT and SCT 
assume that the ideological/political/cultural context and the specific contents of identities 
play a key role in determining the outcomes of psychological processes, the psychological 
processes themselves are assumed to remain invariate. Certainly, there may be common 
psychological processes that characterize all types of social identities, but there may also be 
specific processes associated with different types of identities and their specific contents and 
ideological framework. For instance, the adoption of a particular ideological frame of 
reference (e.g., communitarian vs. liberal; see Condor & Abell, 2006) about national identities 
may lead people to embrace different reflexive stances towards their own identity, and to 
develop complex relationships with that identity that go beyond the simple identification/dis-
identification dichotomy. 
 The particular content and ideological context of politicized identity may well vary, 
but must necessarily be related to principles of a political nature, such as legitimacy, justice, 
fairness, the right to self-determination, etc. To express this argument in the terminology of 
SCT, the dimensions of intergroup comparison provided by the superordinate category must 
be relevant to the political claims– in the same way that, for instance, moral categories must 
be based on dimensions that can inform moral claims. The fact that the SI approach has 
tended to assume that identical processes underlie all forms of social identity means that it 
cannot enlighten us about the differences between (to pursue the example) political and moral 
identities. 
 Second and finally, another key characteristic of politicized identities lies in their 
‘essential contestedness’ (Gallie, 1956; Swanton, 1985), i.e. the fact that they are not only 
open to contestation, but that they will inevitably be contested since that contestation is a 
natural correlate of the political dynamics in which they are involved. Any definition of 
European identity, for instance, is bound to have implications for the (il)legitimacy of 
political integration at the European level (Duchesne, 2008; Sindic, 2010), and it is precisely 
because of those political implications that it is actively and consciously contested.  
 This essential contestedness can be seen as a logical consequence of the processes 
described by both SIT and SCT, but also as a factor that they are somewhat ill-equipped to 
handle. On the one hand, since both theories emphasise how identities have key consequences 
for social influence and political mobilization, it is only logical to infer that those who wish to 
shape the political opinions and actions of others will attempt to formulate and disseminate 
particular definitions that suit their specific political purposes. Put differently, it is the various 
attempts to create political consensus that gives rise to political contestation over the meaning 
of politicized identities (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & 
Reynolds, 1998). Empirically, studies show that those who attempt to mobilize support for a 
political project use argumentative principles that are remarkably in line with SCT’s 
principles, such as maximizing the scope of the ingroup, minimizing the scope of the 
outgroup, and defining the content of ingroup identity in order to make it normatively 
consonant with their message (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b). 
  On the other hand, the way in which both SIT and SCT describe the contextual 
antecedents of identity contents leaves little theoretical room for such purposeful contestation. 
In SIT, perceptions of permeability, legitimacy and stability are typically taken for granted as 
a point of departure from which questions as to their consequences are being addressed 
(Reicher, 1996), and the question of what, in turn, shape those perceptions, is often deferred 
to other disciplines such as sociology or social history (Tajfel, 1979). This suggests a view 
where the contents of social identities are the results of sociological and historical forces 
beyond purposeful human agency. In SCT, this is even more apparent since the perceived 
content of categories is almost entirely and mechanically determined by the immediate 
comparative and normative social context. Yet, it is a key part of the political process itself – 
perhaps even one of its most essential characteristic and purpose – to contribute to the 
elaboration of the meaning of social and political realities, such as who we should compare 
ourselves with and on what dimensions, what is and what is not legitimate, and what can or 
cannot be changed. 
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